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The False Promise of Principled Negotiations  
 
 
Víctor Martínez Reyes 
Orlando School of Negotiation 
 
 
For over two decades, the method of principled negotiation has been the dominant 
formative approach to negotiation. Its flagship book, Getting to Yes (Fisher & Ury, 1981; 
Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991) remains the standard presentation of the method. Getting to 
Yes promotes the method of principled negotiation as an all-purpose strategy of negotiation. 
The authors of Getting to Yes developed the method of principled negotiation as an 
alternative to positional bargaining. In this article, the author contends that the method of 
principled negotiation is not the all-purpose strategy of negotiation promised in Getting to 
Yes. Furthermore, the author contends that the method of principled negotiation is not a 
strategy of negotiation at all. In addition, the author contends that by persuading that 
principled negotiation is an all-purpose strategy Getting to Yes misleads negotiators, 
hinders the development of actual negotiation strategies, and leads to suboptimal results in 
many negotiations. In this paper, the author discusses the main concepts used in building 
the method of principled negotiation and shows that the method is built on incomplete 
definitions and erroneous assumptions. The author argues in favor of moving beyond the 
method of principled negotiation in order to find actual solutions to the challenges posed 
by different negotiations. Thus, the author proposes using a variety of strategies designed 
to achieve different goals, instead of trying to use, in every case, the “all-purpose” 
method/strategy of principled negotiation.  
 
Introduction 
 
Negotiation is a goal-oriented and voluntary process of communication between two or 
more individuals or organizations. The goal of negotiation is to provide each of the 
negotiating parties with an outcome it desires. The parties may negotiate to exchange 
resources in a transaction, or they may negotiate to join forces in a cooperative effort to 
generate the result they want. Negotiation is a basic tool in the management of personal 
and organizational conflicts. Negotiation is a crucial managerial skill.  
 Negotiating can be difficult and costly. The cost of negotiations includes spending 
financial resources, devoting time, and being emotionally engaged. A negotiator pays the 
price regardless of the result of the negotiation. The investment can be significant, and 
makes sense only in the context of the specific goal the negotiator wants to achieve. 
 Because negotiations can be difficult and costly, professional negotiators and 
organizations are permanently looking to increase negotiation efficiency and effectiveness. 
Every reasonable negotiator searches for better ways of negotiating. Negotiators attend 
seminars and workshops, and buy books in a search for new ideas.  
 Books and seminars about how to negotiate are plentiful. Most of them promise a 
universal solution to negotiation’s dilemmas: all a negotiator has to do is to follow few 
simple recommendations and all negotiations will end in successful agreement. This is 
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fantasy. The easy and universal solutions are inevitably the result of oversimplifying 
negotiations. Usually, the authors or presenters examine a particular situation or type of 
negotiation and then generalize their recommendations to all types of negotiations. 
 The best-known and most influential book about negotiations is Getting to Yes: 
Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (Fisher & Ury, 1981; Fisher et al., 1991). The 
book promotes the idea of using the method of principled negotiation as an all-purpose 
strategy of negotiation. The authors of Getting to Yes developed the method/strategy of 
principled negotiations in several additional publications. This article takes into account 
the content of the sequels of Getting to Yes.  
 Getting to Yes is a model of reader-friendly and persuasive writing. Its argumentation 
is commonsensical and the examples recall situations well known or easy to imagine. The 
book makes the case for the method of principled negotiation in a very appealing manner. 
Getting to Yes is a wonderful introduction to the negotiation of transactions, particularly 
within the context of an ongoing relationship (for example, between husband and wife). 
There is no doubt that all negotiators would benefit by mastering the advice contained in 
Getting to Yes. At the same time, it is essential to recognize its limitations. 
 
Review of Getting to Yes 
 
The method of principled negotiation consists of a set of four recommendations or 
principles. According to Getting to Yes the four principles put together add up to a very 
special strategy, a strategy anyone can use in any negotiation regardless of the goal of that 
negotiation (Fisher et al., 1991, p. xix).  
 Getting to Yes makes the assumption that “every negotiation is different, but the basic 
elements do not change” (Fisher et al., 1991, p. xix). Thus, according to Getting to Yes, it 
is reasonable to believe that an all-purpose strategy of negotiation exists. This is the 
rationale behind the method of principled negotiation—the all-purpose strategy of 
negotiation. 
 The authors of Getting to Yes believe that all negotiations are basically the same 
process. Getting to Yes explicitly assumes that all negotiations are about transactions in 
which the parties exchange resources, so that each side gets something from the other 
(Fisher et al., 1991, p. xvii). In addition, they believe that positional bargaining (or 
haggling) is the prototype for all negotiations; they call it the standard strategy. Thus, they 
built the method of principled negotiation as an alternative to positional bargaining (Fisher 
et al., 1991, p. 6). 
 The four recommendations of the principled method of negotiation are: 
 
 Separate the people from the problem 
 Focus on interests not positions 
 Invent options for mutual gain 
 Insist on using objective criteria 
 
 For example, the method advises that in a negotiation, instead of rejecting the other’s 
position openly, a negotiator should ask questions about the rationale behind that position 
(focus on interests not positions). Thus, the negotiator may lead the others to discover by 
themselves the flaws in their positions. Also, as a consequence, the negotiator may get a 
better understanding of the others’ interests. This recommendation has its origins in an 
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ancient Greek method of debate often called Socratic questioning. Getting to Yes also relies 
on the use of scientific reasoning, directing that disagreement between individuals should 
be settled on the basis of evidence and objective rationality. In this way, the goal of a 
negotiation becomes a quest for determining the truth, independent from the subjective 
preferences of the negotiators. This idea of a rational spirit in search of truth, to which 
personal preferences have to give way, also can be traced back to ancient Greece.  
 The method of principled negotiation can be seen as an attempt to bridge the divide 
that exists between negotiations that take place in society at large, and the functioning of 
the scientific community when settling academic disputes. It is a call for negotiators to 
keep emotions under control and behave rationally. In addition, the method is based on the 
idea that negotiations are non-zero sum games—that individuals negotiate because of an 
implicit assumption that agreement is possible. As such, the recommendations contained 
in the method of principled negotiation—each independently—are valid.  
 In the field of alternative dispute resolution, these recommendations have a long 
history: (1) the use of objective criteria, is a core element in any reasonable judicial system, 
it is used in arbitration and, of course, when negotiating the settlement of a preexisting 
conflict; (2) the idea of inventing multiple options from which to choose is the core element 
of package negotiation, in which the goal is to find a Pareto optimum allocation; (3) the 
focus on interests instead of positions is a basic tool used in mediation; and (4) the use of 
joint brainstorming techniques to invent solutions is an essential feature of teamwork and 
cooperation negotiation.  
 
The Main Flaws of the Method of Principled Negotiations 
 
Oversimplification of Negotiations  
 
Getting to Yes sees negotiation exclusively as a means of getting something from the other 
in a transaction (Fisher et al., 1991, p. xvii). Getting to Yes does not recognize that 
individuals may negotiate to get things from the other (if the other has the desired 
resources) or they may negotiate to join forces with the other to produce the desired 
resources. Thus, Getting to Yes does not recognize the difference that exists between 
negotiating to buy something from someone and negotiating to marry that person.  
 Also, Getting to Yes does not see the distinctiveness of the negotiations that define 
management. A manager’s job consists, precisely, in getting things done through and with 
others. The very existence of every organization is the result of an effort to integrate the 
parties. In transactions the goal is to exchange, allocate, or redistribute resources the parties 
already have, usually for independent use by the parties after negotiation. In contrast, in 
negotiations to join with others the parties’ goal is to generate something they do not have 
(hence cannot exchange). In this case, after the negotiation, the parties stay together, share 
resources, and start working jointly to achieve the goal they have agreed upon.  
 The difference between negotiations to unite (merge or marry) with the other and 
negotiations to buy a service from that other is enormous, both in terms of the purpose and 
of the procedure required to reach a viable agreement. For example, usually formal 
negotiations of transactions begin with an initial offer (or with a call for an offer). In 
contrast, formal negotiations aimed at creating a new relationship (for example in a merger) 
usually begin with an opening statement. These are two completely different documents 
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that serve different purposes and initiate different negotiation procedures. In less formal 
circumstances, when buying something, the beginning of the process is usually the tag 
price (initial offer). If, on the other hand, one side wants to marry the other, the first one 
may start the conversation with an “I love you”—an opening statement. In a marriage 
negotiation, advancing a price offer would be a terrible faux pas.  
 Some negotiations have elements of both types of negotiations, for example, when an 
individual negotiates employment with an organization. The negotiation is about bringing 
the parties together in a new type of collaborative relationship, and simultaneously each 
side expects to get something from the other. The strategy the parties will use, in this 
negotiation, depends on the projected significance of the relationship. In some cases, the 
negotiation strategy will emphasize the transactional aspect of the contract, and in other 
the joining together aspect of the agreement.  
 The method of principled negotiation is about transactions and settlements involving 
resources that are external to the parties. In transactions, the parties can look at the 
resources at stake (product offered and payment required) as external to, and independent 
from, the mutual feelings and attitudes the parties may have. Hence, negotiators can 
separate “the people” (the individuals’ mutual perception and feelings) from “the problem” 
(the things or issues that are at stake). In these negotiations, the substance (the resources at 
stake) is something the parties can give up or exchange. For example, one party can give 
away money in exchange for another party’s product, or as compensation or reimbursement 
for past wrongdoings or loss. In some cases, one can put the money and the products that 
are at stake on a table, and look at them from a distance. The substance exists independently 
from the parties. It is external to the parties.  
 In contrast, in negotiations to join forces, the projected relationship and the individuals 
involved are the “substance” of the negotiation. In this case, a negotiator cannot separate 
the people (or the relationship) from the problem (the substance). For these and other 
reasons the two types of negotiation require the use of different strategies. The definition 
of negotiation used in Getting to Yes does not allow for the differentiation between these 
two cases of negotiations. In reality, it does not allow for the existence of the second type 
of negotiation. 
 Principled negotiation mistakenly assumes that in all negotiations, the substance is 
external to the negotiating parties. The method of principled negotiation fails to recognize 
that in some negotiations the parties themselves and the relationship they share is the 
substance of the negotiation.  
 The method thus erroneously requires that negotiators follow the same pattern of 
behavior in both types of negotiations. Principled negotiation asserts that negotiators 
should (1) separate the substance from the parties; (2) build packages to overcome 
conflicting interests; and (3) request objective justification of offers. In addition, 
negotiators should prepare for negotiation by developing their best alternative to a 
negotiated agreement (BATNA) i.e., an alternative source of what they want. 
 The foregoing simple recommendations constitute the whole of the principled 
negotiation method. They leave unanswered, however, a number of questions. What is the 
meaning of developing a “best alternative” in a marriage negotiation? How objective can 
be the parties’ feelings, moral values, preferences, and culture? How can one build 
tradeoffs with abstract values like solidarity, honesty, commitment, autonomy, sympathy, 
care, and love?  
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 In a negotiation to organize a common effort or to fuse with the other, more important 
than what I get from the other is what we can achieve together. The method of principled 
negotiation oversimplifies the multiplicity of types of negotiation processes and ignores 
this important distinction. The method disregards essential elements of merger negotiations 
and other negotiations aimed at integrating the parties. Principled negotiation fails even to 
acknowledge these forms of negotiation as a distinct category. Thus, it does not realize the 
significance of the intangibles in these negotiations.  
 In fact, it is the intangibles that make each organization unique and successful. Rarely 
will a successful merger result where the negotiators have ignored cultural differences, 
values, and the implicit psychological contract. Negotiators that follow the method of 
principled negotiation tend to focus instead on the visible, relatively easy-to-handle, 
material issues. A negotiation to merge turns into negotiating an acquisition (one side buys 
the other), in which the intangibles have been completely disregarded.  
 The failure to recognize the difference between a merger or marriage and a purchase-
and-sale of an asset is repeated in almost every merger negotiation in the United States. 
The failure rate for corporate merger agreements is catastrophic. Available data shows that 
the probability of corporate merger success is much lower than the chance of making a 
profit by tossing a coin.  
 Anyone who has researched merger success rate knows that more than 70% of all 
mergers and acquisitions fail to produce any benefit for the shareholders, and over half 
actually destroy value (Suri & Joshi, 2011). 
 Both the quality of an agreement and the likelihood of implementation success are a 
function of the quality of the negotiation that led to the agreement. We can infer, therefore, 
that too often there is something wrong with the way negotiators are handling merger 
negotiations. In most cases, the negotiators are smart businesspersons who have been 
trained in the most expensive negotiation programs in the country. The negotiators’ failure 
reflects in very large part a failure of the model of negotiation that they have been taught—
a failure of the method of principled negotiation.  
 
Misunderstanding of the Concept of Strategy  
 
Getting to Yes obscures the topic of negotiations by failing to clarify many basic terms 
(e.g., strategy, relationship, agreement) and failing to take into account that many of these 
terms have multiple competing meanings in vernacular English and in social sciences. For 
example, the authors of the method of principled negotiation are indecisive about how to 
name the set of recommendations they put together: is it a method, an approach, or a 
strategy of negotiation? They use these concepts interchangeably.  
 In most cases, Getting to Yes calls principled negotiation a method, although the book 
also says that there are three strategies: hard positional bargaining, soft positional 
bargaining, and principled negotiation (Fisher et al., 1991, p. xviii). The book calls the first 
two the standard strategies of negotiation. The book also states that there are other 
strategies. We can only guess that these are the nonstandard strategies, but Getting to Yes 
does not reveal what these are.  
 To make things worse, Getting to Yes claims that the method of principled negotiation 
is a strategy that serves “all purposes;” in other words, that the method of principled 
negotiation is a strategy one can use in any negotiation, regardless of the particular goal of 
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that negotiation. In Getting to Yes, when designing a strategy, the particular goal of the 
negotiation does not matter.  
 But, does it matter? To answer this question, let us imagine General Grant writing to 
President Lincoln that, while he does not have a strategy for the upcoming campaign, he 
knows and is confident in a fighting method or approach to war. Would President Lincoln 
have found Grant’s confidence in a method or approach and acceptable substitute for a 
strategy? A more recent example: What would have been the reaction if President Obama 
had said to Congress that he does not have a strategy for fighting ISIS, but that he has a 
method by which to carry out the fight? Most individuals intuitively know that there is a 
difference and that the difference matters.  
 In a social interaction, a strategy is an action plan designed by one side to achieve a 
specific goal when the result also depends on the actions of the other side. Negotiators need 
strategic planning because the actions of others remain largely uncertain and beyond 
control. A strategy requires rational justification.  
 A method, on the other hand, is a procedure designed to tackle a known and repetitive 
task, in situations largely under control and with low uncertainty about the result. A 
person’s use of a method of doing something is often a matter of personal preference or 
taste.  
 A strategy is designed to achieve the goal promptly and with the minimum waste of 
resources (i.e., effectively and efficiently), whereas a method does not have to be efficient, 
as long as it promises to accomplish a task. For example, one can cook a Thanksgiving 
turkey following an ancient method used by one’s ancestors. The method may involve very 
inefficient tools, but, if at the end the turkey is cooked, the method was good enough. The 
only justification for using the method may be sentimental reasons. A strategy requires 
thoughtful implementation. In contrast, a method may require the thoughtless repetition of 
some steps.  
 Getting to Yes argues in favor of using the all-purpose method/strategy of principled 
negotiation saying that the basic elements in all negotiations are the same. This is upside 
down reasoning: the factor that determines the design of a negotiation strategy is the 
specific goal the negotiator wants to achieve, not the basic elements common to all 
negotiations. Of course, negotiators need to know the basics. Nevertheless, strategic 
thinking requires negotiators to look forward to the specific goal they want to achieve. 
Different negotiation strategies exist precisely because negotiators seek to achieve different 
goals.  
 The method of principled negotiation does not have a specific goal; it is “all-purpose.” 
Because the method does not have a goal, it does not constitute a plan. Therefore, the 
method of principled negotiation is not a negotiation strategy. And, if the method is not a 
strategy, then it necessarily cannot be the all-purpose strategy promised by Getting to Yes.  
 The existence of an all-purpose strategy is inconsistent with the very notions of 
strategic choice. To choose a person needs, at least, two viable alternatives. If a universally 
efficient and effective strategy in negotiations would exist, then the discovery of that 
strategy would render strategic thinking redundant and obsolete. If the method of principled 
negotiation would be the all-purpose strategy that Getting to Yes claims it to be, then there 
would be no need for further strategic thinking in negotiations. The concept of strategy 
would lose its meaning and the only remaining problem would be the tactical detail: how 
to implement the all-purpose strategy, how to express emotions, how to deal with the 
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other’s emotions, how to react to verbal attacks, where to sit during a negotiation, and so 
on. The followers of the method of principled negotiation seem convinced that this is the 
case.  
 If, on the other hand, the method of principled negotiation is not in fact an all-purpose 
strategy, then to persuade negotiators that it is, has to lead to suboptimal results in most 
negotiations. This is true, particularly, in the context of organizational and business related 
negotiations. Organizations are complex entities that have extremely diverse stakeholders 
and that pursue very different goals in their relationship with those stakeholders. An 
organization that does not differentiate its strategies is condemned to be inefficient and 
ineffective in most of its negotiations. Like, for example, in the aforementioned case of 
merger negotiations.  
 
A Mixture of Elements of Different Strategies 
 
Instead of serving to achieve one goal, the recommendations of the method of principled 
negotiation serve two purposes. One is getting something from the other side in a settlement 
(using objective criteria). The other is getting something from the other in a package 
agreement (using tradeoffs). If the goal of a negotiation is either of these— reaching an 
objective settlement or building a package agreement— then the recommendations of 
principled negotiation can be very handy.  
 Nevertheless, these are two different goals that often lead to contradictory results. In 
the negotiation of a settlement based on objective criteria, the parties’ preferences about 
allocation are of secondary significance (and often completely irrelevant). Objective 
criteria negotiation is similar to arbitration: the settlement has to be legitimate from a 
perspective external to the parties and independent of them. In contrast, a package 
agreement results from an effort to please the parties’ preferences. A package agreement is 
good enough if the parties like it and believe it is implementable. External opinions are less 
important (and often completely irrelevant).  
 In a negotiation in which the goal is to allocate gains (or losses) between the parties, a 
negotiator may use one of the foregoing recommendations first, and, if that does not work, 
then the other. For example, the negotiator may present a package offer. If it does not work 
(the offer is rejected), then the negotiator may try the other recommendation: he or she may 
ask for an objective justification for the other’s position. Where both parties are reasonable, 
having these two options may help in settling disagreement over allocation of resources. 
Negotiators may have the option of using the two recommendations separately (almost 
never simultaneously) precisely because these two recommendations belong with different 
strategies. The method of principled negotiation mixes elements of these two strategies 
without recognizing the differences and contradictions that exist between them.  
 The following analogy may help clarify the issue at hand: imagine a pharmacist who 
realizes that the majority of customers coming to the pharmacy buy the same few 
medicines. These are popular medicines that are effective treatment for some common 
conditions (let’s call them the “standard diseases”). The pharmacist decides to take portions 
of each of the few popular medicines, mix them together, and market the mixture as an all-
purpose medicine.  
 Is the mixture likely to cure anything? Most likely not, and if it does, it is purely by 
chance, or because of a placebo effect. In fact, you probably cannot expect the mixture to 
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cure even the diseases that the original components normally cure (when in the right 
quantities and without the interference and side effects of the other components). Is the 
mixture actually likely to provoke damage? Yes! Individuals would be taking doses of 
medicines that they do not need, in which case the effects of combining the drugs may be 
devastating. 
 Of course, the pharmacist can show examples of how each of the marvelous separate 
components efficiently deals with particular conditions. Regardless of how wonderful and 
convincing the examples may be, however, it does not mean that the mixture will work as 
an all-purpose medicine, or that the mixture cures a particular disease.  
 The pharmacist’s claims are simply false, if not absurd. Nevertheless, because many 
customers have used in the past the original components and know about their efficiency, 
they may be persuaded to think that the mixture also will work wonders. The pharmacist 
can easily find customers ready to confirm that they had used (some of the components of) 
the medicine and that the particular component(s) worked.  
 This absurd pharmacist example characterizes the problem of the method of principled 
negotiation: the method is a mixture of elements from different strategies. The method has 
been presented in a very reader-friendly manner including wonderful examples. 
Nevertheless, it is built on faulty definitions and false assumptions and, under detail 
examination, its flaws become visible. The method is not a coherent strategy of negotiation 
at all.  
 The particular recommendations of the method of principled negotiation are associated 
with different negotiation strategies and different alternative methods of dispute resolution. 
For example, the idea of using objective criteria is a core element in arbitration and 
settlement negotiations. In arbitration, the goal is to settle a conflict regardless of the 
parties’ preferences (arbitration does not care about “mutual gains”). On the other hand, 
inventing options of mutual gain is a basic element in package negotiation and mediation. 
In these strategies the goal is to create an agreement based on the parties’ preferences. 
Therefore, in package negotiation, the parties spend time looking for tradeoffs 
(compromises) that reconcile their conflicting preferences. Getting to Yes does not 
recognize that these two recommendations have different purposes that, in some 
circumstances, may render them mutually incompatible. Getting to Yes simply mixes them 
and calls the mixture an “all-purpose strategy.”  
 A significant element in the method of principled negotiations is that conflict should 
be resolved on its merits. This is the foundation of academic debate. It is important to 
remember the difference that exists between academic debate and negotiation. The two 
processes have a common element: in both there is a process of communicating back and 
forth for the purpose of reaching consensus. Nevertheless, usually the outcome of an 
academic dispute is not negotiable—it is a zero-sum game. An academic statement is either 
correct or incorrect. One side wins—the one that is correct, and the other loses—the one 
that is incorrect. In an academic debate about the truthfulness of a statement there is a lot 
of room for insisting on using objective criteria, but there is no room for inventing options 
for mutual gain.  
 For example, in this article the author claims that the method of principled negotiation 
is not an “all purpose strategy.” This is a dispute about the truthfulness of a statement made 
in Getting to Yes. There is no room for negotiation: there are only two possible and 
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contradictory results; Getting to Yes is right and the author of this article wrong, or vice 
versa.  
 If the parties cannot find a decisive argument to settle an academic dispute, then the 
conflict remains unsolved and all scientists and academics can do is to continue to search 
for the truth. Of course, someone may argue that the difference between the parties is 
merely semantic and, therefore, that there is no real contradiction. But, then negotiation 
would not be necessary either because there would be no conflict. Clarification would 
suffice.  
 The advocates of principled negotiation may not like this article, its argumentation, 
analogies, examples, and style. They may accuse the author of not being polite enough, of 
having bad intentions or of being ignorant, and they may be right in all accounts. They may 
argue that the timing of the article is unfortunate, etc. But, all these arguments are irrelevant 
and even silly, because what counts is the merit of the debate, i.e., to decide who is wrong 
and who is right. This is the rationale behind the advice given in Getting to Yes to focus on 
the merits. Also, this is the argument behind Godwin’s law that prohibits “playing the 
Hitler card” in online debates—the first one that accuses the other of being a Nazi loses the 
debate. In a debate, the side that launches personal attacks or focuses on non-issues reveals 
the hopelessness of its position. 
 Negotiations are much more complicated and varied than academic disputes! In 
negotiations, the parties often deal with future and uncertain events, and with constantly 
changing human needs, preferences, and subjective perceptions. Negotiations serve to 
manage social conflicts and ethical dilemmas much more difficult than establishing the 
truthfulness of an academic statement. Science can provide knowledge and criteria useful 
and often decisive in the negotiation of social conflicts. Also, the scientific method can 
provide some tips about the process of negotiations, but these tips are by no means an all-
purpose strategy of negotiation.  
 The fact that all negotiations share some common features does not release negotiators 
from the obligation of designing appropriate strategies to attain different goals. The 
different goals a negotiator may face include, for example, settling a conflict after a breach 
of a previous agreement, determining the exchange price of commodities between mutually 
indifferent negotiators, building a Pareto optimal package agreement, joining forces with 
the other to achieve a specific objective before a deadline, merging for the lifetime with 
the other to form a new entity, etc. Each of these goals requires a different strategy. In all 
of these situations it is advisable to keep emotions under control and behave rationally. 
Nevertheless, keeping emotions under control and being reasonable does not constitute a 
strategy; it is not even a method of negotiation.  
 Negotiators need to be flexible. They need to know how and when they can make 
tactical adaptations during a negotiation. Nevertheless, a change of strategy is a different 
matter: strategic change usually implies a redefinition of the goal of the negotiation. 
Normally, the decision to modify the goal of a negotiation requires independent, calm, and 
thoughtful consideration of different scenarios. A change of strategy “in the heat of battle” 
is a symptom of poor strategic thinking.  
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A Misunderstanding of Positional Bargaining  
 
In addition to the failure to provide a definition of strategy, Getting to Yes lacks a definition 
or explanation of some other crucial concepts, such as agreement. Consequently, many 
schools that preach the method of principled negotiation began to fill in the blanks with 
their own, often flawed, ideas. The most absurd of these ideas include, among others, that 
positional bargaining is a zero-sum game and that an agreement negotiated using positional 
bargaining is a “win-lose” result. 
 According to Getting to Yes, an important difference between positional bargaining 
and the method of principled negotiation is that in positional bargaining “the result is 
frequently an agreement less satisfactory to each side than it could have been” (Fisher et 
al., 1991, p. 5). In other words, Getting to Yes recognizes (correctly) that agreement 
negotiated using positional bargaining does provide both sides with a gain. Simultaneously, 
Getting to Yes says that the gains that the parties get when using positional bargaining are 
smaller than the gains they could get using the method of principled negotiation.  
 After recognizing that positional bargaining provides both sides with gains, Getting to 
Yes embarks on building a method that, in contrast to positional bargaining, provides both 
sides with mutual gains. This lack of logical consistency is behind many misunderstandings 
in the further development of the method of principled negotiation. Does positional 
bargaining provide both parties with gains or not? Many readers have drawn the 
unfortunate conclusion that positional bargaining precludes the parties achieving mutually 
beneficial results. 
 It is important to understand that there is a significant difference between “less 
satisfactory result for each side” and a “win-lose” or zero-sum result. Echoing the authors 
of Getting to Yes, we contend that any genuine agreement represents a “gain-gain” result. 
Any genuine agreement is the result of a voluntary decision made by the parties, because 
each of them independently considers the result “good enough”—each sees the agreement 
as a gain. In reality, when talking about positional bargaining, Getting to Yes contests the 
size of the gain that each party gets, not the fact that the gain is there. The fact that an 
agreement was negotiated using positional bargaining does not make it a “win-lose” or 
zero-sum result. Also, notice that the fact that an agreement represents gains for both sides 
(or mutual gains) does not mean that the relationship between the parties has changed or 
that the parties have been integrated.  
 In order to better illustrate the issue, let us imagine that you want to buy a car. Like 
millions of individuals in the United States every year, you decide to haggle hard to buy 
from a dealer in your city. After spending one hour in the showroom haggling over ever-
smaller amounts of money, you reach an agreement with the dealer over the price. You say 
“yes” to an offer made by the dealer.  
 Why did you say “yes?” If you are like the majority of buyers in this market, you said 
“yes” because the price was good enough, i.e., you perceived buying the car for that price 
as a gain for you. Would you buy from a dealer knowing that you can make a better deal 
buying somewhere else, or not buying the car at all? If you are like most buyers, you would 
not. Also, you can assume with high certainty that the dealer has made a gain 
simultaneously. Do you think the dealer would sell you the car knowing that he or she 
would be worse off by selling you the car than would be by keeping it? You have to assume 
that most dealers know what they are doing and that they will sell you the car only if the 
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sale represents a gain for them. In other words, after haggling hard over the price, both 
sides have reached an agreement and both consider it a gain. There is no “zero-sum” or 
“win-lose” result, just a “gain-gain.”  
 During the positional negotiation that you had with the car dealer in the example 
above, every additional dollar that you had to pay was an additional gain for the dealer. By 
the same token, every additional dollar that you claimed was a “loss” for the dealer. This 
dynamic looks like a zero-sum game, but it is not. That is because each side has a different 
perception of value of the exchanged resources. The dealer values more the money that 
you are willing to pay than the car that he or she is willing to relinquish, and vice versa, 
you value more the car than having the money. Because of the significance of the difference 
in perceptions of value, the additional dollar that you claim or concede does not change the 
overall non-zero sum character of the interaction. You may pay more or less for the car, 
but as long as the amount that you pay is, for you, of lesser value than the car, you have a 
gain. And, voilà! After hard positional negotiation, the distributive agreement represents 
an “enlarged pie.”  
 The basic assumption behind positional bargaining is that negotiators haggle over the 
exchange price of resources to determine a price that both sides can accept voluntarily. You 
can never assume that anyone will voluntarily make a decision that he or she considers 
worse than the alternative (unless the person is insane). Therefore, a legitimate agreement 
is always a non-zero-sum result, and the game of genuine negotiation is always a non-zero-
sum game. There is no other way in which you can think about the result of positional 
bargaining, particularly in a business environment in the free market. Let me emphasize 
that, by referring here to genuine or legitimate negotiation, we are excluding interactions 
in cases of blackmail, extortion, coercion, or patent deception.  
 Notice that the very concept of agreement implies that the parties are independently 
making a voluntary decision. For both parties to say yes, each has to perceive the agreement 
as a source of gains (even if these are only relative gains, as when individuals agree to 
something to minimize losses). Because every legitimate agreement represents a gain-gain 
result (regardless of the strategy used to negotiate it), it is redundant to state that the goal 
of a negotiation strategy is to reach an agreement of mutual gain.  
 Of course, negotiators sometimes make mistakes. Sometimes, for example, they sign 
agreements that they should not have signed. This happens in any kind of negotiation, 
integrative or distributive. Nevertheless, if you have the opportunity to talk to a negotiator 
at the moment when he or she says “yes,” you will notice that, at this very moment, each 
negotiator believes that he or she will be better off with the “yes” than with a “no.” It is 
this belief, at this very moment, that makes the negotiator say “yes.” It does not matter how 
the agreement has been negotiated, so long as it is a genuine agreement the moment the 
parties say “yes;” the agreement is a gain-gain result: each side is convinced it has a gain.  
 After making a serious decision (individually or in negotiations), parties have a 
tendency to feel uneasy and to have second thoughts. Often, individuals begin to consider 
a revision of the decision and sometimes they try to undo previous decisions. Sometimes, 
after accepting an agreement, individuals develop a feeling that the decision was wrong or 
that they may have been taken. Psychologists call this phenomenon post-decision 
dissonance.  
 The causes of post-decision dissonance are complex and often have little to do with 
the actual rationality or profitability of the decision. Negotiations may make post-decision 
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dissonance acute, by providing a counterpart that a negotiator can blame for the decision. 
Nevertheless, post-decision dissonance can have many causes, including a lack of self-
knowledge (individuals often do not know what is good for them), uncertainty about the 
future, personal insecurity, and the like. Individuals may feel taken or regret having made 
a decision because of psychological factors that have little to do with the process of 
negotiation or with the quality of the agreement. Individuals may develop post-decision 
dissonance regardless of the strategy that the parties have used or the goal that they 
achieved. Even in a merger (or marriage), in which there has been nothing over which to 
haggle, the parties may feel that the decision was a mistake (which may be true).  
 
The Significance and Meaning of the Relationship between Negotiators  
 
A major assumption of the method of principled negotiation is that most negotiations 
happen within an ongoing relationship, i.e., a preexisting relationship (Fisher, et al., 1991, 
p. 20) that is expected to continue largely unchanged after the negotiation. Therefore, it 
says, it is a crucial task for negotiators to protect or even cement the existing relationship. 
Furthermore, Getting to Yes maintains that positional bargaining represents a burden upon 
the ongoing relationship. That is one of the main reasons why negotiators should forego 
use of positional bargaining and embark on using the method of principled negotiation.  
 The idea that most negotiations take place within an ongoing relationship is difficult 
to contest, in part because it depends on the definition one uses. Nevertheless, if we accept 
the distributive definition of negotiation used to develop the method of principled 
negotiation (that all negotiations are about transactions), we cannot overlook that most 
negotiations of transactions in the free market are between strangers (and about agreeing 
on a simple voluntary exchange). In most cases, mutually indifferent strangers politely 
exchange proposals, reach or fail to reach agreement, and eventually exchange resources 
and then walk away. They do so expecting not to meet each other again (which does not 
change the fact that most individuals behave politely). And, if they meet again, it is by 
chance. You probably interact daily with different individuals who want to sell you 
something. In most cases, these are individuals you did not know previously, and who will 
remain strangers for you after the negotiation.  
 In most business dealings, properly performed, positional bargaining poses no major 
threat to the relationship between the parties. Getting to Yes has drawn the wrong 
conclusions about positional bargaining. At best, its conclusions about positional 
bargaining are an exaggeration. In reality, in many business situations, positional 
bargaining is a good enough strategy that allows the parties reaching mutually beneficial 
results.  
 Yes, in negotiations (including of transactions), it is reasonable to advise that 
negotiators pay attention not to inflict damage on the relationship (no matter how 
insignificant or ephemeral) or offend the other side. But, there is a big difference between 
paying attention not to damage a relationship (which a negotiator should do by default) and 
changing one’s strategy for the sake of protecting it.  
 Getting to Yes presents the relationship between negotiators in an extremely simplistic 
fashion. In Getting to Yes, the only dimension that matters is how good or bad the 
relationship is. Getting to Yes does not realize that negotiators often negotiate precisely the 
kind of relationship that they wish to have with others. Strangers negotiate to form a team, 
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friends negotiate to create business partnerships or to become romantic partners, companies 
negotiate to merge, and couples negotiate to marry. In these negotiations, the parties do not 
just improve an ongoing relationship; they transform it. It is not about having a good or 
bad relationship; it is about having a specific relationship. In many negotiations, the goal 
is to transform the relationship so that in its new form it is more efficient, satisfying or 
profitable than the previous one. In negotiations to integrate the parties, the negotiators 
may not be interested, at all, in a substantial exchange. They may just want the parties to 
contribute to the common effort. Sometimes, the parties’ contributions to the common 
cause may be completely intangible. For instance, their main contribution may be their 
skills or motivation, or just their presence.  
 It is true that, amongst other purposes, individuals use negotiations to deal with 
conflict between parties, where conflicts have the potential to damage an existing and 
significant relationship (or the prospects for such a relationship). This is true particularly 
when conflict management by the parties is poor. 
 Getting to Yes is the beginning of a series that includes Getting Past No: Negotiating 
Your Way from Confrontation to Cooperation (Ury, 1991) and Getting Together: Building 
Relationships As We Negotiate (Fisher & Brown, 1988). Each of these subsequent books 
develops additional aspects of the method of principled negotiation, but without making 
any corrections to the original, principal method of principled negotiation. All of the books 
make the same implicit assumption about the universality of principled negotiation. All see 
negotiation as limited to getting something from the other in a transaction; in all, the 
substance at stake is always external to the parties. They strive to elaborate upon, and 
extrapolate from, the method of principled negotiation, but none looks back to question or 
go beyond the foundations of the method of principled negotiation.  
 Getting to Yes focuses on the tactics negotiators can use to make a profit in transaction 
or to settle a conflict. Getting Together: Building Relationships as We Negotiate, instead 
of focusing on the transaction, looks at ways to preserve the ongoing relationship in which 
the negotiation occurs. Both books assume that the relationship between the parties is the 
background behind the negotiation. Therefore, the books assume that the relationship 
should have little or no (negative) impact on the negotiation, and, vice versa, the 
negotiation should have little or no (negative) impact on the relationship.  
 Despite the implication that readers might draw from the title, Getting Together is not 
about building new relationships. Instead, it is about keeping existing relationships. It is 
not about negotiating to join forces in a new team, but about settling differences within an 
existing team. It is not about merging or creating new organizations, but about negotiating 
transactions within an existing organization. The advice contained in Getting Together—
to be unconditionally constructive—is reasonable, useful, and applicable to almost any 
existing relationship. Unfortunately, it does not solve any of the shortcomings of the 
method of principled negotiation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Admittedly, the commonsensical recommendations of the method of principled negotiation 
contain good general psychological advice, namely, be reasonable and keep emotions 
under control. Obviously, a person who is reasonable and who keeps emotions under 
control has a higher likelihood of success in any social interaction—including negotiations 
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and war—when compared to an unreasonable person who easily loses control. The 
reasonable person will settle preexisting conflicts more efficiently than will an irascible 
person. As well, when trying to negotiate a Pareto optimal allocation in a package deal, the 
reasonable person is more likely to do better than the irrational one. But, this does not mean 
that being reasonable is a negotiation strategy. Being reasonable is just a precondition for 
formulating proper negotiation strategies. A proficient and successful negotiator must be 
far more than just a reasonable person. 
 Negotiation is a goal-driven activity and negotiation strategies have a clear managerial 
purpose. The goal of a negotiation strategy has to meet managerial standards: it has to be 
specific, measurable, and time-framed (Doran, 1981). A principled negotiation’s declared 
goal is to reach wise agreements, in an efficient manner, while improving the relationship 
between the parties (Fisher et al., 1991 p. 4). This goal sounds wonderful, but from a 
managerial perspective is meaningless. Without the specifics it does not conform to the 
requirements of a properly defined goal. Even if Getting to Yes specifies the meaning of 
“wise,” still the declared goal of principled negotiation is too general and vague—it is just 
a wish.  
 The very idea that the method of principled negotiation could be an all-purpose 
strategy of negotiation is an absurd. An all-purpose strategy, by definition has no specific 
purpose, hence is not a strategy. The method of principled negotiation cannot be all-
purpose and a strategy of negotiation simultaneously. An all-purpose strategy would be 
like a flying horse; if an animal flies it is not a horse, if it is a horse it does not fly. A flying 
horse may exist only in a mythical world.  
 Persuading negotiators that principled negotiation is an all-purpose strategy of 
negotiation has several undesirable outcomes:  
 
1. It inhibits strategic thinking—strategic thinking becomes unnecessary.  
2. It inhibits, beyond reason, the use of positional bargaining.  
3. It blocks proper understanding of the scope of negotiations.  
4. It leads to suboptimal results in many negotiations  
 
 The idea that four commonsensical recommendations will be enough to tackle every 
negotiation is ridiculous. The reality is that negotiators need to move beyond the simple 
recommendations of principled negotiations. Negotiators have to learn to formulate proper 
goals and design appropriate plans for particular negotiations. Strategic thinking and 
strategic planning are particularly important in the management of organizational 
negotiations. It is impossible to manage different types of negotiations with multiple 
stakeholders using the simple approach proposed by the method of principled negotiations. 
Negotiators have to move beyond principled negotiation.  
 Getting to Yes fails to provide unequivocal definitions of the concepts it uses to build 
the method of principled negotiations. This weakness leads to further mistakes and 
misunderstandings. Concepts like strategy, method, tactics, distributive, integrative, 
agreement, gains, etc. become twisted and vague. To move beyond the method of 
principled negotiation and to have a sound debate about formative ideas in negotiations, 
we need to agree on the definitions we use.  
 We suggest, for example, that in the context of negotiations, we use the traditional 
meaning of the words distributive and integrative. Thus, a negotiation is distributive if the 
goal is to agree on the terms of a redistribution of resources the parties already have. This 
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is the case, for example, in buying/selling transactions, when deciding who has to pay 
compensation to the other in a settlement, or when allocating gains in a package agreement. 
On the other hand, a negotiation is integrative if the goal is to integrate the parties (to bring 
together or unify the parties). This is the case, for example, when individuals negotiate to 
join forces to form a new company or to marry, or when companies merge or when nations 
create new international organizations to solve common problems.  
 These definitions are different from the understanding of “distributive” and 
“integrative” in the method of principled negotiation. The method of principled negotiation 
assumes that a negotiation is distributive if the parties negotiated the agreement using 
positional bargaining or, if one or both sides are unhappy with the result. Hence, if during 
the negotiation the parties redistribute resources as tradeoffs in a package agreement and 
both sides are happy with the result, then the negotiation is deemed integrative (the 
distribution of gains in the package has been “integrated”).  
 Using the term integrative negotiation to talk about integration of the parties, and 
distributive negotiations to talk about the allocation of resources between the parties, has 
several advantages. It helps define the goal of the negotiation and design an appropriate 
plan to achieve it. The new understanding of the main categories of negotiation strategies 
is simple: it does not depend on the negotiators’ evolving and subjective perception of the 
result of a negotiation. There is no need to wait for the result, to know the type of 
negotiation that just took place. The new definitions also are concordant with the use of the 
terms in other social sciences. Political scientists, for example, talk about European 
integration meaning that several states have joined forces in a common organization. The 
new definitions work better in the context of management—an activity aimed at getting 
things done with and through people. In addition, the new definitions would set negotiators 
free from prejudices against positional bargaining.  
 If we agree to use the new (but traditional) definitions of “integrative” and 
“distributive” negotiations, then the main differences between the two can be summarized 
as follows (Martinez Reyes, 2014):  
 
1. In distributive negotiations, the goal is to agree on a reallocation of resources that the 
parties control. In contrast, in integrative negotiations, the goal is to build up and redefine 
the relationship that exists between the parties.  
2. As a result of distributive negotiations the parties get what they want from the other; as 
a result of integrative negotiations the parties engage in collaborative action with each 
other. It is this collaboration that promises to provide both sides with what they want.  
3. In distributive negotiations, an agreement is a compromise that represents an immediate 
gain and partial gratification for both sides; in integrative negotiations, the agreement 
represents a potentially complete solution to the parties’ problems—there is no need for 
compromise.  
4. Distributive negotiations imply that the parties have control over the negotiated 
resources, to such a degree that they can make decision about giving them away. In 
integrative negotiations, the parties join forces and pool resources, instead of giving them 
away. The parties do so because they hope to gain control over resources that they do not 
have at the time of the negotiation. In some cases, the parties may create jointly intangible 
resources or resources that remain beyond anyone’s control. These are resources the parties 
cannot distribute, as in an agreement aimed at improving the quality of the air in a city.  
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5. In distributive negotiations, the substance of the negotiation (the resources at stake) is 
external to the parties; in integrative negotiations, the substance is the parties themselves 
and their relationship.  
6. As a result of distributive negotiations, the relationship between the parties may not 
change at all. As a result of integrative negotiations, the relationship between the parties is 
completely transformed. The parties may become integrated even for the lifetime—there 
is no going back to the previous relationship. (p. 46) 
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